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The welfare states of today are being confronted with the outcome of 
major shifts in their core demographic processes of fertility, mortality and 
migration. Some of these shifts are relatively recent developments (the impact of 
international migration, for example), while others (such as fertility decline and, 
more particularly, mortality decline) have a longer history. The combined effect 
of these shifts suggests a common demographic future for modern Western 
society which is characterised by slow and decreasing population growth and 
imminent population decline, population ageing, changes in household 
composition and, in most countries, changes in the ethnic composition of their 
population as well. The underlying demographic determinants of these changes 
are structural and can be summarised as: sustained low and late fertility, 
increasing life expectancy, changing family formation patterns and the growing 
impact of international migration. Social processes such as internationalisation, a 
rise in educational attainment and an increase in female labour force participation 
are directly related to these demographic processes and are accompanied by socio-
cultural changes in attitudes, norms and values which are part and parcel of the 
ongoing process of modernisation.  
These demographic shifts are challenging the way societies are organised 
today and more particularly how they should be organised in the future, and 
governments will need to respond with policies that accommodate these shifts. 
The structural nature of these demographic changes and the many ways they are 
linked to broader socio-structural and socio-cultural processes, coupled with 
public opinions and attitudes towards population issues, preclude “interventionist” 
or traditional population policies aimed at redirecting or reversing the underlying 
demographic trends. From the point of view of the major demographic trends in 
fertility and mortality, these policies are neither feasible (fertility) nor desirable 
(mortality). Low fertility and low mortality are here to stay, or so it would seem, 
at least for the foreseeable future, and population ageing is the inevitable outcome. 
International migration is a different matter and potentially more susceptible to 
direct policy intervention, although it has only a minor impact on population 
ageing.  
Set against this backdrop, this paper will briefly describe the demographic 
profile and recent fertility trends in the Netherlands, examine Dutch public 
opinion and attitudes towards combining work and childcare, and discuss family 
policy initiatives. We will begin with a brief discussion of the general 





2.  Setting the stage: a demographic profile of the Netherlands 
 
Population growth 
The Netherlands is one of the most densely populated countries in the 
world, with 385 inhabitants per square kilometer. Its current population of 16.1 
million is projected to grow to a maximum of 18.1 million around the year 2040, 
followed by population decline.  
The present rate of population growth is 0.8 per cent, which is among the 
highest in Europe, surpassed only by Luxembourg (1.3) and Iceland (1.5) in 
western Europe, and Turkey (1.5) in southern Europe. Average population growth 
for Europe as a whole is 0.1 per cent (Council of Europe, 2002).  
Figure 1 summarises the trends in the Dutch population growth rate, by 
natural growth (births minus deaths) and migration (immigration minus 
emigration). Both natural growth and migration are expected to decline, thereby 
causing a decrease in population size in the long term, in common with most other 
developed countries.  
 
Population ageing 
The relatively young age structure of the population of the Netherlands, 
which is the result of a relatively late decline in fertility and an impressive baby 
boom in the decades immediately following the Second World War, is one of the 
main causes of ongoing population growth. Although still young from a European 
perspective, the population of the Netherlands will age rapidly in the near future 
due to sustained low fertility and increasing life expectancy.  
The current life expectancy at birth in the Netherlands is 75 years for men 
and 80 years for women. The comparable figures at the beginning of the 20th 
century were 50 and 52 years respectively, indicating an increase in lifespan of 
some 25 to 30 years mainly due to the successful battle against infectious diseases 
and the decline in infant and child mortality. During the course of this process, 
differences in male and female mortality initially increased sharply, with women 
benefiting more from the mortality decline than men. The leading causes of death 
today are coronary diseases, and chronic diseases such as cancer. Figure 2 charts 
developments in life expectancy over a period of 150 years. 
The ageing process in the Netherlands may be lagging behind the pattern 
in the rest of Europe, but it won't be long before it catches up. From 2010 onwards, 
when the large post-war baby boom generations reach retirement age, the 
proportion of older adults (65 and over) will increase from its current level of 
roughly 14 per cent to a projected peak of almost 23 per cent around 2025. Italy 
currently has the highest proportion of older adults in Europe (18 per cent).  
The proportion of elderly people (80 plus) within the population of older 
adults will also increase; this process is generally referred to as “double ageing”. 
The current proportion of elderly people about 3 per cent will increase to 
roughly 8 per cent around the year 2050. At present, almost a quarter of older 
adults are more than 80 years old; around 2025, this will have increased to a third. 
Figure 3 summarises the shifts in the age structure of the Netherlands over a time 
span of a century (1950-2050).   
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It should be noted that population ageing also occurs below the traditional 
benchmark age of 65. The ageing of the economically active or  working-age 
population and its imminent decline is particularly relevant from a policy 
perspective and is linked to family policies, as will be shown below. 
The dependency ratio, i.e. the ratio of non-active to economically active 
people, provides a summary guide to population ageing. It is only a rough 
indicator for various reasons: the denominator only gives the potentially active 
population and not those actually in work; the cut-off points are also increasingly 
questionable, both in terms of young adults (most of whom will not have entered 
the labour force at age 16) and in terms of older adults (some of whom will have 
retired before the age of 65, while others will continue to be economically active 
after the age of 65). Taking this into account, the dependency ratio summarises 
the dual processes of population ageing, i.e. “dejuvenation” (the declining 
proportion of younger adults) and “greying” (the growing proportion of older 
adults). It can also be regarded as an indicator of “demographic pressure”. In the 
Netherlands, the young age dependency ratio has gradually declined over the past 
decades and is now relatively stable at a level of about 27 under-15s per 100 
people of working age 15-65. This suggests that the dejuvenation of the 
population has more or less run its course. The old age dependency ratio, however, 
which is currently 20 people aged 65 and over per 100 people of working age, is 
only just beginning to increase. The combined dependency ratio of 47 is in the 
mid range for Europe (Council of Europe, 2002).  
 
Living arrangements 
The process of modernisation has been accompanied by changes in the 
formation and dissolution of relationships. Marriage has declined from an almost 
universal standard arrangement to merely one of the options available to partners, 
albeit still a dominant one. Until the 1970s, over 90 per cent of people married, 
and the age at first marriage was low (23 for women and 25 for men). By the 
1990s, the first marriage rate had decreased to about 70 per cent, and the age at 
first marriage had increased to 28 for women and 30 for men (Prins and Verhoef, 
2000). Divorce rates have increased to a fairly stable level with some 30 per cent 
of marriages ending in divorce and this rate is expected to remain stable. The most 
recent household projection (De Jong, 2001) predicts that the number of 
households will increase over the coming decades from the current level of 6.8 
million to 8.3 million in the year 2035, and then level off. The major determinant 
of the growth in the number of households is the sharp increase in one-person 
households from 2.3 million today to 3.4 million in 2035. The number of couples 
(both married and cohabiting) will increase from the current level of 4.1 million to 
4.5 million, which suggests that this living arrangement will remain dominant. 
There will, however, be a further decline in the proportion of married couples, 
from the current 3.5 million to 3 million in the year 2050. This downward trend 
will not be triggered by a further decrease in (first) marriage rates which are 
projected to remain relatively stable, thereby indicating the continuing popularity 
of marriage but will primarily be caused by increasing mortality due to ageing. 
The decline in the number of married couples will be more than offset by an  
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increase in unmarried cohabitation. Unmarried cohabitation has increased 
spectacularly, but has not replaced formal marriage. Most couples still opt for a 
marriage certificate when they seriously consider having children. The number of 
single parent families, predominantly female headed, will remain relatively stable 
at a level of around 400,000. The population in so-called institutional households 
will slowly decline in the short term, reflecting older adults' need for 
independence, but will increase in the longer term due to population ageing. 




One of the main features of recent population development in the 
Netherlands has been the change in the ethnic composition of the population 
caused by international migration. Although the latter process has always played a 
part in the demographic development of the country, its impact has increased 
substantially over the past decades. Bearing in mind the decline in natural 
population growth, the impact of international migration (the inflow) and the 
subsequent growth of the resident migrant population will remain an important 
factor in Dutch demography. The current population of foreign descent
1 numbers 
2.7 million, some 17 per cent of the total population. About half of this group are 
migrants of so-called non-western origin, with Turkey (300,000), Surinam 
(297,000) and Morocco (252,000) being the major countries of origin. The largest 
proportion of Western migrants originates from the European Union (736,000) 
and Indonesia, a former Dutch colony. The migration of non-western migrants 
shifted from labour migration in the 1960s to family reunion and family formation 
migration in later decades. Asylum migration has been the main source of inflow 
in recent years. These trends have led to a vast increase in the diversity of 
countries of origin of migrants.  
Figure 5 summarises the projected size and ethnic composition of the 
foreign population in the Netherland . 
The projections indicate that the non-western migrant population in 
particular will increase from its current level of 1.3 million to 2.3 million in the 
year 2015 (Van Wissen and De Beer, 2000). 
 
Late fertility 
Fertility rates in Europe after the Second World War were still above what 
is known as replacement level (2.1 children per woman). In the Netherlands, the 
fertility rate remained high until the 1960s as a result of the baby boom generation, 
but since then began to decline dramatically. The number of large families fell 
sharply, and two children became the ideal family size. The Netherlands is not 
one of those countries which has extremely low below-replacement fertility, 
unlike, for example, various southern and eastern European countries. The 
                                                           
1 Statistics Netherlands defines the migrant population of the Netherlands as inhabitants who have 
at least one parent who was born outside the Netherlands. Migrants who were born abroad 
themselves are so-called first  generation migrants; those born in the Netherlands are second 
generation migrants.  
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average family size in Eastern Europe is currently 1.2 children and, in southern 
Europe, 1.3 children. The figure for Western Europe is currently 1.5. In recent 
years, the (period) total fertility rate has increased marginally in the Netherlands 
again (from 1.5 to 1.6 in the 1980s and early 1990s to the current level of 1.7), 
although the (cohort) total fertility rate shows that women are having an average 
of almost 1.8 children. The fact that the period figures are lower than the cohort 
figures indicates that people are postponing having children. The number of 
childless families is also on the increase triggered by rising levels of education 
with a greater likelihood to remain childless among the higher educated. 
According to data of Statistics Netherlands, the percentage of women in the 
Netherlands who remained childless notwithstanding their attempts to get 
pregnant increased from 3 to 4,4 per cent for the birth cohorts 1945-1969. The 
percentage of these birth cohorts who stayed voluntary childless, increased from 9 
to 18 per cent (Steenhof and De Jong, 2000). 
The timing of the first child is the result of a highly complex decision-
making process in which the labour force participation of the woman, the 
decreased importance of parenthood, and the desire not to commit until one has 
sufficient economic security (a job, an income, a home) all play a part. Education 
has also been found to be a key reason why people postpone having children. The 
higher the level of education, the longer parenthood is postponed. Having children 
late is therefore not simply due to the availability, acceptance and proper use of 
effective contraception, but more particularly due to a number of changes in 
people's life-courses. More and more women are pursuing further education and 
are not entering the labour force until the age of twenty or later. They want to 
work for a few years before starting a family. All these factors have contributed to 
29 being the average age at which women in the Netherlands currently have their 
first child. That age has increased considerably over the past few decades. Around 
1970, it was five years lower, and nine out of ten first children were born before 
the mother was 30 years old. Soon this will occur in less than half of all cases. 
Nowadays, almost 11 per cent of women delay motherhood until age 35 or later. 
In 1970, this was true for only two per cent of women. 
 
Summing up 
In summary, we may conclude that the demographic situation of the 
Netherlands is not that different from the rest of Europe, although its population 
growth rate and the stage it is at in the ageing process differ somewhat from the 
overall European pattern. In terms of the other demographic dimensions, the 
Netherlands is quite in keeping with the north-west region of Europe of which it is 
a part. 
As regards fertility, the increasing labour force participation of women 
confronts more couples with the obstacles to combine employment and family 
care, inter alia resulting in delayed and low fertility. Family policies have a role to 
play in this regard. Before addressing this issue, public opinion and attitudes 
regarding family policy options will be discussed. 
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3.  Opinions and attitudes regarding family policy: the micro perspective
2 
 
Perceived obstacles to family formation 
Having children is a decision, which often has a profound effect on 
people’s life-courses, and a major impact on the way they lead their lives. Many 
people, and in particular women, tailor other spheres of life, such as their careers, 
to family formation. So the choices people make affect not just their own lives, 
but also society as a whole. This is why it is important that policymakers have an 
understanding of the obstacles people encounter and the preferences they have in 
terms of their own life-courses. In the MOAB (Opinions and Attitudes on Aspects 
of Population Issues) survey carried out by the Netherlands Interdisciplinary 
Demographic Institute (NIDI) in 2000, the perceived pro’s and con’s of having 
(additional) children were asked. The responses suggested that the advantages of 
having (more) children revolved primarily around 'emotional' aspects of life, such 
as giving someone a sense of security, being appreciated and respected by people 
other than one's family, and fulfilling one's potential. The disadvantages were 
perceived primarily in terms of time and money (see Table 1). The general view 
was that when you have children, you end up sacrificing time which could 
otherwise have been spent on yourself, your interests and on your friends and 
acquaintances. Having sufficient financial resources was also seen as one of the 
problems associated with having a child. Many people realise that it is still 
difficult to combine parenthood with the economic independence of both partners: 
two-thirds of the respondents (aged 16-44) of this nationally representative survey 
believe that having children makes it more difficult for both parents to earn an 
income. Men and women, older and younger generations and people with 
different levels of education on the whole have the same views, except that men 
are more concerned (than women) about the financial consequences of having a 
child. For many women, forming or extending a family in particular conflicts with 
their own scope for personal development. 
Having time for oneself is regarded as a bigger problem by the more 
highly educated who, in particular, believe that, once a child is born, there will be 
less time for their own interests and their social contacts. This is perceived as less 
of a problem by those with a low level of education. This is probably because, in 
practice, it is more common for highly educated women (than for less educated 
women) to remain in employment after the birth of a child and they would 
therefore have less time over and above their family responsibilities to meet 
friends or pursue other interests. 
 
General views on combining work and family responsibilities 
Over the past twenty years, the Netherlands has been confronted with a 
spectacular growth in the number of women combining paid work with 
motherhood. This increasing female labour force participation has, to a limited 
extent, gone hand in hand with increased male participation in household 
activities and childrearing, although there is as yet little evidence of men and 
women modifying their working week to enable an equal division of work and 
                                                           
2 This section is largely based on Schippers, 2002.  
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childcare. Despite the government’s efforts to promote the so-called 'combination 
model' for the equal division of work and childrearing between partners, this 
appears in its present format at least to be a proposition that appeals to only a 
minority of people in the Netherlands. This is evident from people's views on 
working parents in general as well as from attitudes towards how they would 
prefer to share responsibility for  work and childrearing within their own 
households. General views on the division of labour considered desirable for men 
and women are shown in Table 2. 
Combining a full-time job with fatherhood was found to be the option 
most preferred by men. Combining fatherhood with a part-time job came in a 
good second. Men's and women's views on the male’s input in the division of 
labour were not that dissimilar, but they did differ. On the whole, both men and 
women, but women even more so, felt that combining a full-time job with 
childrearing was the best option for men. And, last not but not least, a small 
percentage felt that men should stop working temporarily or stop working 
altogether when they have children. 
Attitudes towards the female division of labour were different. Although 
the majority of the respondents felt that women should also combine work and 
parenthood, most preferred the idea of women combining motherhood with a part-
time job. Few were in favour of women combining motherhood with a full-time 
job. The general preference was for women to stop working temporarily while the 
children were small. A small group of respondents favoured the idea of women 
ceasing work altogether when they had children. As far as the female division of 
labour was concerned, men were more inclined than women to take the view that 
it was desirable for women to combine a part-time job with their childrearing 
responsibilities. Some of the women agreed with this, but generally speaking, 
women were much more inclined than men to think that women should stop 
working temporarily or permanently when they have children. This suggests that 
men favour shared financial responsibility or on the whole attach more 
importance to financial values and less to childrearing, whereas women seem to 
actually give a higher priority to childrearing or are more inclined to see 
childrearing as their responsibility and financial responsibility as that of the man. 
A higher level of education, results in a greater inclination to favour men 
combining part-time work with childrearing (Table 3). Those with a low level of 
education also had a considerably more traditional attitude towards the female 
division of labour: 46 per cent of them considered it desirable for women to stop 
working (temporarily) when they had children, compared to less than 20 per cent 
of those with at least Higher Vocational Training (HBO). The option for women 
to stop working permanently as soon as they have children seems to remain 
feasible only to those with a low level of education. Combining a full-time job 
with having children is generally considered undesirable for women. 
In short most respondents feel that it is desirable for men and women to 
continue working during the phase in their life-course where there are children to 
be cared for. But how would they like to share responsibility for these tasks within 
their relationship? If we look at the answers given by men and women, three 
arrangements emerge as being roughly equally popular. Twenty-six per cent of  
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respondents preferred a combination of having children and both partners working 
part-time. A quarter of the respondents preferred a situation where the woman 
stopped working temporarily while the children were small. Twenty-one per cent 
of respondents preferred a situation where the man remained in full-time 
employment and the woman combined childrearing with a part-time job. The idea 
of both partners combining childrearing with a full-time job was much less 
popular; only five per cent of respondents were in favour of this. Nine per cent of 
respondents preferred the woman to stop working permanently when she had 
children, and nine per cent of respondents didn't want children at all. What the 
above outcomes show first and foremost is that only a tiny minority of people 
today take the view that a woman should stop working completely and 
concentrate on motherhood. A situation where the woman stops working 
temporarily while the children are small is generally considered a better option, 
although the majority of people feel that, in that situation, both partners should 
continue working. Interestingly enough, a relatively large proportion of 
respondents regarded a part-time job for both partners as being desirable, which 
contrasts sharply with the reality in which the overwhelming majority of men 
have a full-time job. Figures 6a and 6b show the answers given by men and 
women separately. What stands out immediately is that men had a slightly 
stronger preference for their partner to remain in employment than the women 
did: 56 per cent of men preferred a situation where both partners continued 
working when there were children, compared to 48 per cent of women. 
Women, on the other hand, were considerably keener than men to stop 
working temporarily when they had small children (31 versus 18 per cent). This 
suggests that men have more emancipated ideas than women do. A more feasible 
explanation, however, is that women are more realistic when assessing the burden 
of combining work and motherhood and therefore more often choose to 
temporarily interrupt their careers when their children are small, whichdecision is 
influenced by the fact that in general men earn a higher income than women. 
 
Working, parental childcare and third-party childcare 
The decision to have children leads to all sorts of compromises as far as 
finances and ideas about childrearing and children are concerned. The MOAB 
survey examined the dilemmas that working parents find themselves confronted 
with within the children-work-finances triangle. What stands out clearly is the 
conflict between the time available for childrearing and work (Table 4). This 'time 
constraint' is clearly experienced by men as well as women. A third of men said it 
would actually be better for their families if the parents worked fewer hours, and 
four out of ten were even willing to work fewer hours if caring for their children 
became more time-consuming. Once again, men showed themselves willing to 
work fewer hours, but in reality, this rarely occurs. 
Women tailor their working week predominantly to their parenting 
responsibilities and men tailor the length of their working week to their financial 
needs. Half the men said they would like to work fewer hours as soon as it was 
financially feasible, which raises the question of whether the financial obligations 
people take on are such that they have virtually eliminated any freedom of choice,  
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or whether there is a tendency to use financial arguments as an excuse. Women 
were much less inclined to raise finances as an argument and were particularly 
keen to work fewer hours as soon as childrearing became more time-consuming. 
Parenting responsibilities were another important consideration for women who 
were keen to work longer hours. Almost half the working mothers said they would 
like to work longer hours, but not until childrearing was less time-consuming. 
Those with a high level of education were the most convinced that their 
families would benefit from the parents working fewer hours. The actual work 
situation of the partners would have a bearing on this. It is relatively common for 
highly educated parents to both have jobs and few of them were keen to work 
longer hours as soon as childrearing was less time-consuming. Those with low 
and intermediate levels of education were actually more inclined to agree with this 
view, which is probably due to their current work situation as well. It is relatively 
common for this group of women to either not work or to have small part-time 
jobs. And last but not least, young adults (aged 25-34) were more inclined than 35 
to 44-year-olds to work fewer hours if childrearing became more time-consuming, 
finances permitting. 
If both partners continue working after the birth of their child, then some 
form of childcare, whether formal or informal, is virtually always essential. 
Deciding on the level of third-party childcare, and who it is entrusted to, is a 
difficult dilemma for many families. Far and away the majority of parents believe 
that the best carer a child can have is one of its parents: about 80 per cent of 
respondents, irrespective of sex, age or level of education, took this view. 
Although this obviously doesn't stop people using childcare facilities, it does 
mean that, for many people, childcare provided by someone other than a family 
member has to remain limited to a few days a week. A third of Dutch people aged 
16 to 44 believe that children who spend all week in a day nursery are more likely 
to develop problems in later life (see Table 5). 
Even though third-party childcare is becoming more of an accepted and 
common practice, Dutch parents, to a large extent, still prefer looking after their 
own children, particularly when they are young. 
As  Table 6 shows, there is a marked difference between the extent to 
which people with high and low levels of education avail themselves of third-
party childcare in situations where both partners work. This is partly the result of 
differences in levels of employment. At present, 44 per cent of people with a low 
level of education do not use any form of childcare facility, compared to 16 per 
cent of people with a high level of education. The type of childcare facilities they 
use also differs. Highly educated people are more inclined to use paid forms of 
childcare, such as day nurseries, company crèches, paid childminders who come 
to their home, or a so-called 'guest family'. When it comes to making use of day 
nurseries, the differences are particularly marked. Almost 40 per cent of highly 
educated people had made use of them (compared to 13 and 6 per cent of people 
with intermediate and low levels of education respectively). Highly educated 
people were also far more likely to make use of paid childminders who come to 
their home. 
People with a low level of education rely much more heavily on unpaid  
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childminding provided by relatives, which, to an extent, is due to a lack of 
affordable alternatives. But it is interesting to note that their expressed preference 
for unpaid childminding by relatives is lower than their actual use of this facility. 
It is also much more common for people with a higher level of education to 
combine formal and informal childcare. In no fewer than 90 per cent of cases, 
people with a low level of education used only one form of childcare facility, and 
in almost half of these cases it was childminding provided by a relative. The 
majority of highly educated people combine various forms of childcare. 
Remery  et al (2000) showed that the most common form of informal 
childcare is provided by grandparents. If  the government's  policy to promote 
labour force participation continues to be successful, then eventually it will be not 
just mothers, but increasingly grandmothers as well who remain economically 
active. There could well be a sharp fall in the future supply of informal childcare, 
most of which is currently provided by women who are either not in paid 
employment or who have only part-time jobs. The anticipated demographic 
developments show that there are few young adults to replace the older 
generations as providers of informal childcare. Although a pool of informal carers 
is available as a 'last resort' option, they don't offer any real prospects for 
structural changes in childcare practices. Given the selective use made of different 
types of childcare facilities, this is a situation which could put the rapidly growing 
group of less educated women who are combining work and motherhood in a 
particularly vulnerable (economic) position (Esveldt and Henkens, 2001). 
 
Differential needs and preferences 
As will have become clear, not all Dutch people need the same childcare 
facilities. It is therefore useful to examine the needs of men and women who find 
themselves in different work and childrearing situations. 
Table 7 shows that childless women who work full-time anticipate the 
problems they would face if they were to combine motherhood with a full-time 
job. Their first priority, regarding policies, would be to have flexible working 
hours and scope for working part-time. But also, childcare facilities are extremely 
important to this group as well,  more important than to, say, mothers who work 
part-time. This is obviously because some of the mothers in part-time employment 
would already have made satisfactory childcare arrangements. 
Needless to say, the group of non-working mothers presents an entirely 
different picture. Their priorities revolve more around financial arrangements (in 
particular, carer's allowance schemes). They have no need for childcare facilities, 
although some of them would like to see the government reduce the cost of 
childcare. It is possible that the costs associated with childcare prevent them from 
taking on (small) part-time jobs. The fact that these women are interested in 
working is evident from their interest in work-related schemes, particularly 
opportunities for part-time work. As we saw earlier, some of the non-working 
mothers would welcome the chance of working part-time. 
Mothers with part-time jobs indicated that their needs revolve around both 
finances and work leave arrangements. Since they are already in part-time 
employment, they are primarily interested in measures that provide additional  
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support in their existing situation, such as short-term carer's leave if their children 
become ill and a more extended period of leave for fathers when their children are 
born. It is interesting to note that mothers with part-time jobs are almost as 
interested in financial arrangements as non-working mothers are. This is, amongst 
other things, due to the fact that these are primarily women who have small part-
time jobs. Three-quarters of the women with part-time jobs work fewer than 20 
hours a week and especially they are more interested in financial arrangements 
than women with bigger part-time jobs. Many mothers in part-time employment 
are in favour of a carer's allowance scheme as well as an increase in child benefit. 
Their preference is understandable when one considers that a large proportion of 
mothers in part-time employment would prefer to stop working (temporarily) to 
raise their children. The most obvious reason why they do not do this is because it 
would be financially detrimental (or impossible). This partly explains their 
interest in a carer's allowance scheme, which would make it easier for them to 
decide to look after their children full-time. 
Most men work full-time whether they have children or not. The category 
of childless men had more or less the same policy priorities as childless women in 
full-time work and they would therefore also appear to anticipate the situation of 
future parenthood. Although they too considered leave arrangements to be most 
important, the share (51 per cent) was clearly lower than amongst women (65 per 
cent). Working fathers regarded financial arrangements as the most important and 
childcare facilities as the least important. In this respect, they were no different 
from their partners, non-working women with children or women with children in 
part-time work. But they were more in favour of a parent-friendly tax regime than 
women were, and were less interested in a carer's allowance scheme. 
A person's preference as regards provisions and facilities is determined 
primarily by whether or not they have children, and by the division of labour 
between partners. The financial aspects of parenthood don't seem to become 
apparent until one actually has children, and this is true for both men and women. 
Parents are more inclined to favour financial arrangements. This is particularly 
true in the case of non-working mothers and for the category their partners are 
mostly likely to occupy: fathers who work full-time and who are the sole wage-
earners. But mothers with part-time jobs also show a strong preference for 
financial arrangements. This is because their jobs usually involve them working 
less than 20 hours a week. Mothers who work longer hours are slightly less 
interested in financial arrangements. People without children regard financial 
measures as a relatively low priority. They are more concerned with the practical 
problems they will face when they eventually decide to combine work and family, 
and they are particularly interested in work-related arrangements and increased 
childcare facilities. The latter is particularly true in the case of highly educated 
women. Single-income households have much less need for improved childcare 
facilities: after all, they opted for full-time motherhood. 
 
4.  Family policy: shifting perspectives 
 
The Netherlands does not pursue an explicit population policy i.e. a  
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balanced set of policy measures which are aimed at direct intervention in 
demographic processes in order to achieve demographic targets. Indeed there is a 
widely shared reluctance regarding state intervention in the private domain. This 
being said, it is evident that hosts of policy measures have been introduced in the 
past which (may) have a bearing on demographic trends and individual 
demographic behaviour. As a rule these policies were introduced for and 
motivated by reasons which are external to demography, notably for health, 
wellbeing and economical purposes.
3 
Nevertheless, these policies may have an impact on demographic behaviour. 
Although an explicit, interventionist population policy is not being pursued nor in 
place, it is widely recognised that policies are needed which address population-
related social issues, and indeed a policy-mix of measures which may or should 
accommodate demographically induced social changes has developed in the past 
decades, which are generally labelled as "population-related policies". 
In the following we will focus on family policies as a specific example of 
population-related policy. Fertility and family formation are key elements which 
shape the lives of individuals. Most people and in particular women, tailor other 
spheres of their life to these demographic elements. The decision whether or not 
to have children, as well as the timing of parenthood is a private matter for 
individual households, but having a family and children is an important factor 
which inter alia influences labour force participation (cf. Schippers, 2002; Beets, 
1997; Groot and Maassen van den Brink, 1997 and Steenhof, 2000). These 
notions inspired the introduction of so-called "enabling" or "facilitating" policies 
in the 1970's and 1980's, meant to better facilitate parents to combine work and 
family care. These policies originated in the framework of equal opportunities 
policy, since particularly women were confronted with obstacles stemming from 
the combination of work and family life. Since the mid-1980's the policy 
perspective gradually shifted to promote economic independence and hence to 
increase labour force participation, notably of women (cf. Van Nimwegen et al., 
2002).  
The policy perspective was not wholly consistent and reflected the 
continuing dilemma of economic independence on the one hand, and family care 
(both for children and increasingly also for the elderly) on the other. To 
understand the work-care dilemma in the Netherlands, one should recognise that 
an important feature of Dutch society is that couples have a strong tradition in 
taking care of their children themselves. The bourgeois-type family model with a 
working father and a caring mother has long been the traditional norm with a 
subsequent reluctance to opt for childcare facilities, which were to a large degree 
also lacking in our country until rather recently. In the 1990's new policies 
regarding parental leave and maternity leave were introduced, expanding the 
possibilities for parents to combine work and family. Increasing female labour 
force participation resulted in a rising need for childcare facilities, which were 
                                                           
3 A case in point in the field of family policy was the introduction of financial support to families: 
the child benefit system. This policy was and still is only motivated as a means to alleviate the 
financial burden of families with children and not to promote specific fertility behaviour (cf. 
Esveldt and Van Nimwegen, 1992).  
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considerably extended since the mid 1980's. Until that time, childcare was 
perceived to be the responsibility of parents, and childcare facilities were 
predominantly meant as "emergency" provisions. From the 1980's onwards, 
government started to perceive childcare as a shared responsibility of the state, the 
social partners (employers and trade unions) and the parents. From 1996 childcare 
policy was decentralised to local government. Also the costs of childcare facilities 
are increasingly shared by all parties involved, which resulted in a rather complex 
set of arrangements (cf. Van Nimwegen et al., 2002). As of 2004 a new law on 
childcare will become effective, which gives parents more freedom of choice and 
direct access to government subsidies for childcare. Also childcare facilities, 
which almost doubled in the past 4 years, will be further increased under the new 
law. 
In the 1990's the so-called "combination scenario" became a leading policy 
perspective, implying that both parents should have the opportunity to work and 
the care. In practise, this scenario implies that mothers should participate more on 
the labour market while fathers should work less (and intensify care). New laws 
came into force to promote the combination scenario, inter alia to further expand 
childcare facilities. A new balance between employment, family care and 
economic independence involving both parents, is aimed at. In this context it is 
important to note a growing policy concern for so-called late fertility. Compared 
with other countries women in the Netherlands have their children late. This late 
fertility gives rise to concern since a high age at first childbirth results in higher 
numbers of premature births and new-borns with low birth weight and congenital 
defects. Also the decline of early infant mortality has stagnated recently. Until 
gynaecologists started to point out its adverse medical implications, delayed 
parenthood was generally regarded as one of the positive outcomes of equal 
opportunities and labour market policies. After all, people without children have 
fewer restrictions to achieve personal development and economic independence 
while postponing childbirth provides couples with more options to prepare for 
parenthood (cf. Beets et al., 2000).  
 
The life course perspective in family policy 
The combination-scenario focuses at an equal division of work and care 
between the partners in a couple. As such it is a typical example of what has been 
labelled as "quantitative individualism" i.e. a policy perspective which is aimed at 
equality of all citizens (cf. Schnabel, 2001). 
More recently the policy perspective is changing into the general direction 
of so-called "qualitative individualism" stressing the needs for freedom of 
decision making by citizens to shape their lives. The latter is reflected in a life 
course approach to family policy which is more individually targeted and 
customised.  
From a life course perspective a "standard biography" of learning —
working/caring/ retirement— was predominant until the 1950's and 1960's. These 
three phases in the life course were well defined, clearly delineated and had a 
clear-cut gender distinction. During the first phase children were reared and 
educated, boys different from girls; in the second phase men exclusively focused  
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on paid work and women on unpaid care; dual earners/carers were scarce; and in 
the third phase men retired from work while women continued with care.  
During the last quarter of the past century the destandardisation of the life 
course set in, due to ongoing individualisation, rising labour force participation of 
women, rising education and other socio-cultural and structural changes. In the 
course of this process the standard biography gave way to the "choice biography", 
with increased individual freedom and the wish to take one's life in one's own 
hand and make individual choices regarding life priorities such as a family and a 
career. Also the increased possibilities to implement the individually motivated 
choices led to a destandardisation of the life course, which is characterised by a 
combination of activities in each phase instead of a concentration on one single 
activity. This is most evident in the middle phase of the life course in which 
people are combining work, care and education. This phase is also referred to as 
the "rush hour" phase in the life course.  
What are the implications of a destandardisation of the life course for family 
policy? In general, citizens have an increasing need for policy measures which: 
 
•  offer freedom of choice in implementing individual preferences in the life 
course, and 
•  which support the combination of activities throughout the life course, as 
well as 
•  which allow for flexibility and transitions. 
 
As regards measures which support individual preferences, a retreat from 
uniform regulations is most feasible. Life course oriented policies should then 
enable a balance between individual and collective interests, such as higher labour 
force participation throughout the entire life course (also needed in view of 
population ageing), more possibility for unpaid care, especially during the rush 
hour phase in the life course, improved use of human capital in the broadest sense 
and a larger span of control for all citizens. Increased freedom of choice, implies 
more customised and individually targeted policies (a "cafeteria-system") where 
policies are demand-driven in stead of supply-driven. 
As regards the combination of activities, policies which enable a more even 
distribution of needed resources (time and financial) throughout the entire life 
course are called for. Childcare and parental leave facilities and more flexible 
work schedules are already in place but need to be harmonised and integrated. In 
addition to the care for children, facilities to care for the elderly, involving both 
professional care as well as informal care should be expanded. Both short-term 
and long-term leave schemes for carers are needed; a voucher system for care 
leave to be used throughout the lifecourse is being developed. 
Policies which enable smoother transitions between work, education and 
care throughout the life course include life long learning also for those outside the 
labour market, re-entry on the labour market and higher labour force participation 
of the elderly (SZW, 2002).  
It is important to note that the life course perspective on (family) policy is 
currently adhered to by the government of the Netherlands, and it is to be  
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expected that this will remain a dominant feature of Dutch policy.  
 
5.  Conclusion and discussion 
 
Demographic developments are part and parcel of social change. From a 
policy point of view the close interrelations of population and social dynamics 
imply that policy intervention is not an easy undertaking. 
In highly developed open societies, direct intervention in population 
processes through population policies in the strict sense which are aimed at 
demographic targets, are neither feasible nor desirable. But policies which take 
demographic trends and demographically induced social issues into account and 
which are aimed to accommodate the impacts of demographic changes, are both 
feasible and desirable. Family policy is a case in point of this so-called 
population-related policy, as is illustrated in this paper. 
As regardsthe emerging concerns in some countries, such as Japan,  about 
sustained (extremely) low fertility, and the inclination of politicians and 
policymakers to introduce pro-natalist policies to increase fertility, several issues 
need to be taken into account. The first is  that in modern society low fertility 
usually is the outcome of a rational decision of individuals and couples, which 
should be respected. Trying to influence these individual decisions, solely for 
macro-economic or demographic reasons, will not  convince couples to change 
their behaviour. However, if low fertility is the result of limitations experienced 
by individuals or couples to realise their privvvvte fertility intentions, there is 
scope for a more family friendly policy, attuned to the needs of the population. 
The outcome of these policies MAY be that fertility will increase; in our view, 
this  should however NOT be the main motivaton or goal of these policies. The 
second issue is that low fertility as such may eventually lead to a declining 
population (leaving aside migration and mortality). A declining and ageing 
population will of course create an enormous challenge to society, but this 
challenge can and should be addressed, and will have to be addressed since even 
with truly family friendly policies which may offset fertility decline to some 
extent, a full recovery of fertility to, say, replacement level, is neither realistic nor 
even to be hoped for in our view, given the current and projected world 
population trends. 
With respect to fertility and the family several interrelated trends stand out 
in the Netherlands, including low and late fertility, an increasing variety in living 
arrangements, rising female labour force participation rates and rising educational 
levels. These trends have resulted in major changes in the life course of 
individuals and couples where the post-war "standard" biography gradually 
eroded and gave way to more variation and the event of the "choice" biography 
reflecting more individual freedom. 
To be effective and sustainable, family policies should accommodate these 
shifts and should be tailored to an increasing extent to the individual needs and 
preferences of citizens. This emerging shift from standardised policy to more 
individually targeted and customised policies which address the full range of the 
lifecourse and which are not restricted to the family formation phase alone, was  
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described in the paper. Microlevel data on opinions and attitudes regarding 
fertility and family issues taken from a national representative survey in the 
Netherlands, indicate a support for these new family policies. In the broader 
context of an ageing society with sustained low fertility and increasing variation 
in living arrangements, the key issue which should be addressed by lifecourse-
proof family policy is the care-work-education jigsaw puzzle which confronts the 
citizens of today. This puzzle is not a new one. However, the individual pieces are 




Table 1. Percentage of people (aged 16-44) who believe certain issues would 
become easier or more difficult if they had (more) children, 2000 (%) 
 




Having time for yourself and your interests  2  16  82 
Living harmoniously with your partner  10  68  22 
Giving someone a sense of security  33  62  5 
Being appreciated and respected by people other than 
your family 
15 79  7 
Being able to spend enough time with friends and 
acquaintances 
2 22 76 
Having enough money  2  27  71 
Achieving your own potential  6  73  21 
The husband and wife both being able to earn their own 
independent incomes 
2 32 66 
Source: NIDI-MOAB 2000. 
 
Table 2. Attitudes of men and women aged 16-44 towards division of labour 
and childrearing tasks for men and for women, 2000 (%) 
 
  Preferred division of labour for 
men 
Preferred division of labour for 
women 
  Opinion of:    Opinion of:   
 Men  Women Total  Men  Women  Total 
Employed, no children  15  9  12  12  8  10 
Full-time job with 
child(ren) 
46 56  51  11  5 8 
Part-time job with 
child(ren) 
29 31  30  51 45  48 
Temporarily non-
working, with child 
7 3  5  18  31  25 
Non-working, with child  2  1  2  8  10  9 
           
Total  100 100  100  100 100  100 
N  378 374  752  378 374  752 













Table 3. Attitudes of the Dutch (aged 16-44) towards division of labour and 
childrearing tasks for men and women, by level of education, 2000 (%) 
 
  Preferred division of labour for men: Preferred division of labour for women:
 Low  Inter-
mediate
High Total Low Inter-
mediate 
High Total
Non-working,  with  child  3  3 0 2  21  7 4 9 
Temporarily non-working, 
with child 
6  4 5 5  25 28  15  25 
Part-time  job  with  child(ren)  19  30 42 30  37  50 55 48 
Full-time  job  with  child(ren)  62  53 37 51  8  8 10  8 
Employed,  no  children  11  11 16 12  11  8 16 10 
             
Total  100  100 100 100  100  100 100 100 
N  126  407 178 711  126  407 178 711 
Missing       41       41 
Source: NIDI-MOAB 2000. 
 
 
Table 4. Percentage of working parents aged 16-44, by sex, age and level of 
education, who agree with the following statements, 2000 (%) 
 
 Man  Woman 25-34  35-44  Low Inter-
mediate 
High Total 
It would actually be 
better for our family if 
we worked fewer hours 
33 22  26  29  25  25  42 28 
                
As soon as it is 
financially feasible, I 
would like to work fewer 
hours outside the home 
49 17  34  34  27  32  46 34 
                
As soon as raising the 
children becomes more 
time-consuming, I would 
like to work fewer hours 
outside the home 
42 49  43  42  37  46  44 44 
                
As soon as raising the 
children becomes less 
time-consuming, I would 
like to work more hours 
outside the home 
18 46  32  31  33  36  16 31 
                
N 193  156  74  271  57  204  69  349 








Table 5. Percentage of men and women aged 16 to 44 who agree or disagree 
with the following statements, 2000 (%) 
 
 Agree  Disagree 
  Man Woman Man Woman
Children who spend all week in a day nursery  are more
likely to develop problems in later life 
36 33 20 25 
      
The best carers a child can have are its own parents  81  76  4  6 
 
N=752 
    




a of parents who use, or have ever used, some form of 
childcare facility, 2000 (%) 
 










- day nursery  6  13  39  16 
- company crèche  1  1  3  1 
- paid childminder who comes to the home  5  8  24  10 
- 'guest families'/'guest parents'/paid 
  childminders 
11 18  26  18 
- taking turns looking after other people's 
children 
5 8 11  8 
- unpaid childminding done by a family  
  ember 
29 39  39  37 
- other
b 10  9  9  9 
        
- do not use/have not used  44  33  16  32 
a  The total percentage is greater than 100 because respondents were allowed to mention 
more than one type of childcare facility. 
b  After-school and holiday childcare centres, one's own partner, other types of childcare 
facilities. 
Source: NIDI-MOAB 2000. 
  
 
Table 7. Preferences of men and women aged 16-44 with regard to a new enabling policy for parents as compared with 
the current work and family situation, 2000 (%)
a 
 
  Men Women 
 Full-time;  Full-time;  Non-working;  Full-time; Part-time;  Non-working; 
  No children With children No children  No children With children With children 
Measures relating to terms of employment:             
- Better parental leave for working mothers than is currently available  10  8  22  8  12  14 
- More opportunities for parents to work part-time  24  16  27  32  13  21 
- Flexi-time facilities for working parents with school-age children  21  17  24  33  12  15 
- Ten days’ paid leave for fathers when their child is born, instead of the 
  current two days 
22 13  33 21 16 12 
- A short period of career’s leave if children become ill  11  12  14  10  22  8 
- An extended period of career’s leave if children become ill  1  13  3  0  14  6 
Total  Work  51 52  56 65 62 51 
         
Measures relating to childcare facilities:             
- More childcare facilities for children aged 0-4  27  6  9  32  6  0 
- Cheaper childcare facilities for children aged 0-4  15  6  10  10  9  9 
- More childcare facilities for children before and after school hours, and 
  during school holidays (After-school and holiday childcare centres) 
5 6  8 6 4 1 
- Cheaper childcare facilities for children before and after school hours, and
  during school holidays (After-school and holiday childcare centres) 
1 5  6 0 6 1 
Total  Childcare  29 17  22 34 19  6 
         
Measures relating to the financial costs of having children:             
- Lower income tax for people with children  14  23  18  1  13  8 
- Increasing the Child Allowance by NLG 150 per child per month 
  (ie. almost doubling it) 
6 29  7 14 29 30 
- A considerable lowering of the cost of education  23  21  18  21  17  23 
- A ‘career’s allowance’ of NLG 600 per month for parents who look after 
  their children full-time 
15 24  1 12 27 52 
Total  Money  36 62  26 27 56 70 
a  The table only includes the most important ways of combining work and childbearing. The following categories have been omitted for women: full-time with children; 
part-time, no children; and non-working, no children. The following categories have been omitted for men: part-time with children and part-time, no children; and non-
working, with children. 




















































































Figure 1. Population growth in the Netherlands by natural increase 
and migration, 1900-2050 
Source: Van Nimwegen and Beets, 2000. 
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Source: Van Poppel and Ekamper, 1999. 
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Source: De Jong, 2001.  
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Figure 5. Number of foreigners in 2015 
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Figure 6a. Male attitudes towards the way partners aged 16-44 should share 
responsibility for paid work and childcare, 2000 (%) 
 
Source: NIDI-MOAB 2000. 
 
 
Figure 6b. Female attitudes towards the way partners aged 16-44 should 
share responsibility for paid work and childcare, 2000 (%) 
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